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Abstract:  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) exempts small scale payments for 
“routine government action” from its reach.  This article suggests that the FCPA be 
amended in order to forbid these payments as well.  As currently formulated, the FCPA 
does not address the very real damage caused by low-level corruption.  Amending it to 
include small scale bribes would lead symbolic and practical benefits that outweigh 
potential objections.  This is particularly the case if the change is accompanied with a 
modified enforcement and penalty scheme.   
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3Section I:  Introduction 
Current narratives about corruption cast it as a significant challenge to both the 
international community and individual countries, especially developing ones.    
Corruption is linked to reductions in domestic and international investment; increases and 
skewing of government investment as budget items are manipulated to provide bribes and 
diverted towards areas where bribes are more easily obtained; increases in income 
inequality; and various other negative impacts.1 Given the damage caused by corruption, 
efforts to encourage economic development, improve governance and create dynamic 
civil society institutions have increasingly focused on ways to eliminate it.2 Developed 
countries have undertaken significant legal reforms to aid this effort.  But the legal 
framework that addresses this problem in the United States and other developed countries 
suggests a more complicated understanding of how harmful corruption is than these 
countries’ rhetoric at first suggests.  This “nuanced” understanding places a great 
emphasis on large-scale corruption, related to extra-ordinary events like the awarding of 
government contracts.  The everyday corruption that directly affects the texture of daily 
life—small payments to corrupt officials to do the job they are supposed to do—appears 
to spark much less concern.     
The archetypical example of this dichotomy is the United States’ Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA).  The FCPA, passed in 1977, criminalizes bribery outside the 
United States by US citizens, corporations and their foreign subsidiaries.3 Though 
groundbreaking at the time it was passed, US pressure has meant that the FCPA’s 
 
1 See, e.g., Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development:  A Review of Issues, 35 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC 
LITERATURE 1320 (1997); Shang-Jin Wei, Corruption in Economic Development:  Beneficial Grease, 
Minor Annoyance, or Major Obstacle? 8-14 (World Bank Working Paper, 1998);  
2 See e.g., Daniel Kaufmann, Governance and Corruption, in THE QUALITY OF GROWTH (2000). 
3 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1, 2 (1977). 
4provisions were basically copied and extended by an OECD anti-corruption convention—
with the result that numerous industrialized countries have changed their laws to 
criminalize bribery of foreign officials by their citizens and corporations.4 Once a unique 
national effort, the general framework of the FCPA is now an important template for 
global anti-corruption efforts.  This globalization of the FCPA’s policy priorities is 
positive in many respects.  However, the generally uncompromising FCPA framework 
explicitly exempts payments meant to secure the performance of “routine government 
action” (“grease” money) from its scope.5 This exemption has been adopted by the 
OECD anti-corruption convention’s commentaries and has thus been standardized in 
many global anti-corruption frameworks.6
4 See, e.g., Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, art. 1, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention]; Nora Rubin, Note, 
A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to Curb Corruption and Bribery in International Business 
Transactions: The Legal Implications of the OECD Recommendations and Convention for the United 
States, Germany, and Switzerland, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 257 (1998).  In` countries where “legal 
persons” are not subject to criminal sanctions, the treaty calls for non-criminal sanctions to be imposed. 
5 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-1(b) (2000). 
6 OECD Convention, supra note 4 at Commentaries para. 9.  The Commentaries incorporation are not 
required in implementing legislation, but ten of the thirty five countries signing the OECD treaty have 
explicitly incorporated the exemption for low level administrative payments—the United States plus South 
Korea, OECD, KOREA: PHASE 2 REPORT 29 (2004). (“Article 3.2.b of the FBPA provides a defense where 
a “small pecuniary or other advantage is promised, given or offered to a foreign public official engaged in 
ordinary and routine work, in order to facilitate the legitimate performance of the official’s business”. This 
defense is intended to implement Commentary 9 on the Convention concerning “small facilitation 
payments”); Denmark, OECD, DENMARK: PHASE 1 REPORT 3 (2000) (“Denmark explains that [it means] 
to exclude “small facilitation payments” as contemplated in Commentary 9 on the Convention”); Canada, 
OECD, CANADA: PHASE 1 REPORT 6 (1999) (“Subsection 3(4) exempts from the ambit of the offence 
payments, etc. that are made “to expedite or secure the performance by a foreign public official of any act 
of a routine nature that is part of the foreign public official’s duties or functions…”); Slovakia, OECD, 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC: PHASE 1 REPORT 4 (2003) (“The Slovak authorities confirm that “gifts of very small 
value” are meant to cover facilitation payments as defined in paragraph 9 of the Commentaries.”); Sweden, 
OECD:  SWEDEN: PHASE 1 REPORT 4 (1999) (“In addition, in accordance with Commentary 9, “small 
facilitation payments” do not constitute “improper reward”); Norway, OECD, NORWAY: PHASE 1 REPORT 
3-4 (1999) (“The Norwegian authorities confirm that the word “illegally” would give the prosecution 
discretion to not prosecute the giving of facilitation payments”); New Zealand, OECD, NEW ZEALAND:
PHASE 1 REPORT 8 (2002) (Section 105 C subsection 3 paragraphs a) and b) of the Crimes (Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials) Amendment Act 2001 provides a defence in relation to an act committed for the 
sole purpose of ensuring or expediting the performance by a foreign public official of a “routine 
government action” where the benefit is ‘small’”); Australia, OECD, AUSTRALIA: PHASE 1 REPORT 6 
(1999) (“Section 70.4 of the Criminal Code amendments provides a defence to the offence under section 
70.2 in relation to “facilitation payments”, which must be raised and argued by the defendant”); 
5The FCPA exemption is important to consider because of the significant negative 
impact it has on the campaign to reduce global corruption.  As this paper discusses, the 
FCPA exemption can make US and global rhetoric about the importance of eliminating 
corruption seem hypocritical, inward looking and self-interested.  In addition, the 
propagation of the exemption for administrative bribery has the potential of convincing 
other countries and decision makers seeking to learn from the US and OECD examples 
that suppressing administrative bribery should not be a significant priority.  But as this 
paper will discuss, administrative corruption causes serious damage to the economy and 
investment climate and thus should not be left in the backwaters of policy priorities.  
Recent studies have documented high costs (in terms of both time and money) to the 
firms subjected to bribe demands and identified significant negative impacts from 
administrative bribery on general business environments.  Administrative bribes are also 
not essential to conduct business in countries outside the United States.  Especially given 
the broad ranging bribery ban currently in place, the administrative bribe exemption is of 
limited practical benefit to foreign investors.   
 
Switzerland, OECD:  SWITZERLAND, PHASE 1 REPORT 5 (2000) (“Article 322 of the Criminal Code 
provides the offence of bribery ‘for the commission or omission of any act in relation to [the] official 
activity [of the official] contrary to his duties or in the exercise of his discretionary powers’. Pursuant to 
this provision, it seems that the implementing legislation does not apply to all cases where the undue 
advantage is offered, promised or given to foreign public officials in order that they carry out the duties of 
their functions. In the opinion of the Swiss authorities…it is in conformity with Commentar[y]… 9 (on 
small ‘facilitation’ payments) of the Convention”).  Other countries allow exemptions based on the 
Convention text but without specific statutory provision.  See, e.g., OECD, GREECE: PHASE 1 REPORT 3 
(1999).  Other signatories, like France, ban all bribes, including facilitation payments.  See, OECD:  
FRANCE: PHASE 1 REPORT 6 (2000).   While the exemption for administrative bribes is not universal 
among OECD countries, the portion of countries adopting the exemption is sufficient as to constitute a 
significant and worrying trend, especially as many of them are home to important multinationals. 
 
6Given the negative impact of administrative corruption, the relatively limited 
practical benefit of the exemption for “grease” money and the great symbolic 
disadvantage the exemption creates, this paper suggests that the United States repeal the 
FCPA exemption for administrative corruption and lobby for understandings of the 
OECD convention to be amended accordingly.7 This could create significant losses and 
inconvenience for US companies—including losses of business to foreign competitors as 
well as reduced efficiency of current operations.  US authorities will also need to 
consider whether focusing on this type of corruption is the best use of the scarce 
resources they can devoted to this issue.  But the potential global benefits are significant 
enough to outweigh these concerns.  Eliminating the exemption for low-level 
administrative payments in the FCPA, and having the US lobby for changes on a global 
level could mark the start of a new crackdown on administrative corruption and an 
increase in efforts to fight corruption at all levels.  Passage of the FCPA eventually led to 
a significant increase in international efforts to fight corruption.  Amending the FCPA to 
make it more coherent and effective is a logical and necessary extension of this effort. 
 This paper is divided into a number of sections.  Section II describes the history of 
the FCPA, discusses the law’s structure and provides a brief survey of academic work 
dissecting and responding to it.  Section III examines the practical impact of the FCPA—
both in terms of actual criminal prosecutions and the symbolic support that it provides to 
anti-corruption efforts, in order to understand what its actual function is.  Section IV 
focuses specifically on administrative corruption and the harm that it causes.  While 
 
7 In section V of the paper, the potential of sub-dividing the administrative bribery currently allowed by the 
FCPA is discussed.  But analysis of most plausible sub-divisions of these payments quickly reveals that 
they are either too difficult to actually employ, or that the sub-division would not help isolate more and less 
harmful payment types.  Section V’s analysis suggests that attempts to simply amend the scope of the 
FCPA’s current exemption would not be effective at reducing the harmful effects of these payments.  
7administrative corruption does not exactly fit the formal exemption contained in the 
FCPA, it is sufficiently related as to be a good rough guide to the damage caused by  
bribes like those exempted from US criminal prosecution by the FCPA.  Section V 
considers whether it is possible to further sub-divide the low-level administrative 
payments currently allowed by the FCPA in a way that would differentiate between more 
and less harmful corruption—and concludes that there is not.  Section VI proposes 
amending the FCPA to eliminate the exemption for low-level facilitation payments, 
briefly surveying the benefits this could bring as well as reviewing potential objections to 
removing the exemption.  Section VII considers ways in which low-level administrative 
bribes differ from other types of corruption, and outlines penalty and enforcement 
schemes that specifically address these unique characteristics.  Finally, Section VIII 
provides some concluding thoughts on how amending the FCPA relates to broader issues 
surrounding this type of law making. 
8II:  The FCPA’s History and Operation 
a. History 
The FCPA was originally passed by the US Congress in 1977 in response to a number 
of scandals involving US corporations bribing foreign government officials in order to 
secure government contracts and other benefits to themselves.8 It aims to both 
criminalize bribery of foreign officials by US corporations and to require certain 
accounting standards and internal controls from these corporations.  Initially, the FCPA 
(created as part of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act)9 was limited to securities issuers 
and “domestic concerns”10 and required a “territorial nexus” with the United States.11 
From its passage, the FCPA included an exemption for “grease” payments,12 and in 1988 
it was amended to provide additional structural protections to US businesses.13 
Subsequent amendments in 1998 broadened the scope of the Act, removing the need for a 
territorial nexus with the United States (and thus increasing the ability to prosecute 
subsidiaries of domestic firms) as well as criminalizing the act of bribery “by any person” 
rather than just issuers and “domestic concerns”.14 
8 These incidents of bribery came to light after investigations of corporate corruption following the 
Watergate scandal.  See generally Alejandro Posadas, Combating Corruption Under International Law, 10 
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 345, 349-55 (2000); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of 
Multinational Enterprises:  An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 5, 17 (2003); Tamara Adler, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977: A Step Toward Clarification and Consolidation, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1740 (1982). 
9 Walter Perkel, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 683, 683 (2003); 15 U.S.C. §  78 
dd-1 (1977). 
10 § 78 dd-1. 
11 Id.  
12 See Adler, supra note 8, at 1751-52. 
13 These added affirmative defenses and included a call for the US government to pressure trading partners 
to adopt similar laws.  See, e.g., Perkel, supra note 9, at 683-85.  These allow payments as long as they are 
in line with written laws and/or are not given for a “corrupt purpose”.  Id. at 697-98.  In addition, the 
exception for “grease” payments was changed so that the wording referred to “routine government 
actions”—a change that expanded the range of possible bribes.  James Hines, Forbidden Payment:  Foreign 
Bribery and American Business after 1977 at 5, 21 (NBER, Working Paper 5266, 1995). 
14 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-1(g) (2000) (for issuers). 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-2(i) (2000) (for domestic concerns). 
9The FCPA has been characterized as a major burden to US businesses facing corrupt 
foreign competitors.  Mickey Cantor, a US Trade Representative under President Clinton, 
estimated that complying with the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions cost US firms upwards 
of $45 billion in one year alone.15 Other commentators also argued that the FCPA 
constituted a significant drag on US firms profitability.16 In response to these pressures, 
the US amended the FCPA in 1988 to include certain affirmative defenses against bribery 
sanctions.17 In addition, the US government became a major sponsor of attempts to 
punish bribery by firms based in other countries.18 
US efforts to have other countries copy its efforts were successful, and it was 
rewarded when a new OECD anti-bribery convention came into effect on February 15, 
1999.19 This convention marked the culmination of strong US lobbying efforts, and 
coincided with an upswing in attacks on corruption.  Pressured by NGOs like 
 
15 Marlise Simons, U.S. Enlists Rich Nations in Move to End Business Bribes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, 
at A10.  While the actual estimates quoted in official speeches are subject to dispute, the size of damage 
Cantor discussed indicates official concern about the issue.  More detailed estimates have tried to identify 
the impact of the FCPA on US exports in particular industries.  In the aircraft sector, one study suggested 
that sales in high corruption countries dropped 21.2%, significantly more than the 6.4% drop in low 
corruption countries in the years immediately following passage of the FCPA  See Hines, supra note 13, at 
17.   
16 See, e.g., Robert S. Levy, The Anti-Bribery Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977:  
Are They Really As Valuable as we Think They Are?, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 71, 78-83 (1985); John W. 
Duncan, Comment, Modifying The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:  The Search for a Common Standard, 4
NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 203, 206-09 (1982); Adler, supra note 8 at 1746. 
17 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-1(c) (2000) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-2(c) (1994) (for domestic concerns); 15 
U.S.C. §  78dd-3(c) (2000) (for "any person"). 
18 See, e.g., Simons, supra note 15; The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, 5003(d), 102 Stat. 1107, 1424, provides: 
 
(1) Negotiations. It is the sense of the Congress that the President should pursue the negotiation of an 
international agreement, among the members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development, to govern persons from those countries concerning acts prohibited with respect to issuers and 
domestic concerns by the amendments made by this section. Such international agreement should include a 
process by which problems and conflicts associated with such acts could be resolved.  
 
This effort meant making significant changes to accepted ways of doing business. Swiss firms, for 
example, were for many years able to write off foreign bribes as business expenses on their tax returns.  See 
Elizabeth Olson, Swiss Toughen Anti-Laundering Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2000 at C4. 
19 See William M. Daley, Bribery:  No Longer Business as Usual, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999 at 10.  
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Transparency International (TI) as well as the US government, IOs like the World Bank 
began to both fund increasing numbers of anti-corruption programs and to consider levels 
of corruption when making more general funding decisions.20 Importantly, almost all 
OECD governments rapidly ratified the anti-corruption convention.21 Compliance with 
anti-corruption requirements was said to vary significantly,22 but even countries that 
provided very significant tax benefits to corporate bribers appeared to take a harder line 
in at least some cases.23 
While on an international level the OECD convention has gained importance, the 
FCPA continues to be significant both practically and symbolically.  Practically, its 
provisions govern the behavior of US companies, whose activities constitute a significant 
portion of global foreign investment.24 Even more importantly, as the forerunner and 
inspiration for the OECD convention, the FCPA serves as both a benchmark for other 
countries and an indicator of the anti-corruption priorities of the United States. 
b. Practical Impact 
The practical and symbolic importance of the FCPA makes it important to understand 
its provisions—both what it covers and what it does not.  There has also been significant 
academic commentary about the FCPA.  While much commentary discusses its impact 
 
20 See Rubin, supra note 4 at 276-77, 280;  West Africa:  Corruption in Chad-Cameroon Pipeline to be 
Monitored by TI and Non-profit Body, AFRICA NEWS, Mar. 10, 2003.  
21 See Perkel, supra note 9 at n.6. 
22 See, e.g., David L. Heifetz, Comment, Japan’s Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention:  
Weaker and Less Effective Than the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 PAC. RIM. L. & POL’Y 209 
(2002). 
23 See Olson, supra note 18;  Suzanne Daley, French Oil Executive Calls Commissions Routine, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 19, 2001 at A6. 
24 In 2003, US outward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows constituted about 25% of the global total.  
See UNCTAD, COUNTRY FACT SHEET: UNITED STATES (2004), available at 
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3198&lang=1.  
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on business, other pieces have suggested changing specific aspects to make it more 
effective. 
The FCPA as it currently stands deals with two major areas:  Requirements include 
specified accounting/reporting/internal control standards25 and the prohibition on the 
provision of bribes to foreign “official(s)”, “political part(ies)” and/or third persons who 
will pass on bribes to these entities, for the purposes of “influencing” them in any way or 
securing “improper advantage”.26 These prohibitions are absolute within US territory and 
apply to all US nationals outside the United States.27 Firms and individuals can face 
criminal prosecution and civil actions from the Department of Justice (DOJ) (in the case 
of firms not registered under the Exchange Act) and civil action for violating these rules 
from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (SEC enforcement applies only to 
companies registered under the Exchange Act).28 
The FCPA also provides that gifts/payments that are considered legal under the 
written laws of foreign countries, or which meet a bona fide non corrupt purpose.  To 
help firms navigate these areas, the FCPA requires the DOJ to issue advisory opinions on 
the legality of certain payments (and in some cases encourages firms to seek these, 
especially in the case of bona fide payments).29 
The FCPA’s provisions are genuinely tough—individual violators can face fines 
of up to $1,000,000 along with many years in jail.30 But the FCPA does have significant 
omissions.  One of these is the fact that there is no private right of action—generally only 
 
25 15 U.S.C. § §  78m(a), 78m(b) (2004). 
26 15 U.S.C. § 78dd 1(A)(3)(Ai). 
27 See Perkel, supra note 9 at 694. 
28 Id. at 699-700. 
29 15 U.S.C. § 78dd 1(d). 
30 See Perkel, supra note 9 at 701-04. 
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the DOJ can initiate criminal prosecutions, so individuals and organizations with 
evidence of corrupt activity must provide their information to the DOJ if there is to be 
any enforcement.31 Given that there have been relatively few prosecutions for FCPA 
violations since its inception (with many firms investigated settling rather than going to 
trial), this leaves open the risk that many violators escape without prosecution.32 
A second omission, and the focus of this paper, is a specific “[e]xception for 
routine government action”.  This exempts “facilitating” or “expediting” payments meant 
to “expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action by a foreign 
official, political party, or party official.33 Though the statute includes no mention of any 
caps on payments, these have in practice been limited to $1000 or less when actually 
reviewed.34 At its core, this text explicitly states that certain types of bribery will not 
cause the payer legal problems in the United States. 
c. Critical Responses to the FCPA 
Academic literature dealing with the legalities of the FCPA extends from critiques 
about its impact on business and general effectiveness to more specific critiques of 
specific individual provisions and suggestions for change.  Some commentators complain 
that the act (and its ambiguities) do little to curb corruption but much to chill business 
 
31 Id. at 699-700; There are some limited circumstances where private rights of action are available.  See 
Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market:  A Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 231 (1997). 
32 See, e.g., Salbu supra note 31 at 236; Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations 
and Conducting Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC Consent 
Decree Settlements, 18 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 305, 305 (1998); Leslie Eaton, Triton Energy Settles 
Indonesia Bribery Case for $300,000, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1997 at D2. 
33 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-1(b) (2000) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-2(b) (2000) (for domestic concerns); 15 
U.S.C. § §  78dd-3(b) (2000) (for any person). 
34 See Perkel, supra note 9 at 697. 
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and/or to steer it to non-US competitors.35 Others question whether the ban on payments 
is culturally imperialist.36 The 1988 amendments, which specifically allowed payments 
permitted by written laws in the jurisdictions where they are made, addressed some of 
these concerns.37 More recent articles have examined actual enforcement of the FCPA,38 
and the implementation of the OECD convention, commenting specifically about 
problems of differential enforcement by countries for whom corruption outside national 
borders is not a major concern.39 
Certain critiques have recommended specific changes to the FCPA—like 
incorporating a private right of action into the law.40 Other reviews have been more 
general, including some summary discussion of the FCPA’s exception for facilitation 
payments.  A particular focus of general criticism and specifically of the facilitation 
payment exception is its ambiguous nature.  It is not clear exactly which payments would 
qualify as facilitation payments and which would be held to contravene the FCPA for 
reasons of size or actual purpose.  These types of critiques generally suggest clarifying 
the FCPA rather than completely eliminating the facilitation payments exception.41 
35 See, e.g., Salbu, supra note 31 at 261-71; Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Note, Ambiguities in the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act:  Unnecessary Costs of Fighting Corruption?, 61 LA. L. REV. 861, 868-81;  
36 See, e.g., Salbu supra note 31 at 275-79; Christopher J. Duncan, Comment, The 1998 Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Amendments: Moral Empiricism or Moral Imperialism?, 1 ASIAN-PACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 14 
(2000). 
37 See Perkel, supra note 9 at 683, 697. 
38 See, e.g, Mathews, supra note 32; Salbu supra note 31; Agnieszka Klich, Note, Bribery in Economies in 
Transition:  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 121, 123-24 (1996). 
39 See, e.g., Barbara C. George et. al, The 1998 OECD Convention:  An Impetus in Worldwide Changes in 
Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L. J. 485, 515-24 (2000); Haifetz, 
supra note 22. 
40 See Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of Action, 82 
CAL. L. REV. 185 (1994).  Other commentators suggest various other solutions.  See, e.g., Salbu supra note 
31 at 280-87; Taylor supra note 35 at 881-86.  
41 See, e.g., Taylor supra note 35 at 874-77, 881-86. 
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III:  Impact of the FCPA 
 In order to understand the impact and actual operation of the FCPA, it is 
important to review some cases in which this law has played a role.  While they are not 
numerous, the actions against business executives accused of bribery outside the US 
provide a useful guide to the types of behavior that actually lead (or do not lead) to legal 
sanctions, to the problems in implementing this legislation and to FCPA provisions that 
address these problems.  More substantially, they carry significant symbolic content—as 
a both a deterrent to other companies and an example to other countries and companies.  
Full court cases with guilty verdicts constitute only part of the FCPA enforcement 
narrative (many companies plead guilty to avoid the extra sanctions of a guilty verdict)—
its also important to consider settlements and investigations, which provide additional 
insight into both investigator motivation and company priorities. 
 a. Legal Choices and Actual Prosecutions 
SEC and DOJ enforcement of the FCPA has been uneven, with FCPA 
enforcement appearing to be a relatively low priority for certain administrations in 
particular.42 The reasons for this lack of enforcement could include a desire by various 
administrations to avoid creating extra obstacles for American business expansion abroad 
and the difficulties in assigning responsibility for activities conducted abroad.  Many of 
the cases discussed below illustrate different ways the FCPA attempts to deal with these 
problems—and thus underscore the problems’ existence.  The relatively small number of 
cases brought also underscores the importance of the FCPA’s symbolic dimensions. 
 
42 See Mathews, supra note 32 at 305; Eaton supra note 32 at D2.  
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One way the FCPA attempts to address the problems of proving actual bribery 
abroad is a relatively extensive set of accounting regulations43 which focus not so much 
on the act of bribery as on efforts to conceal it.  Prosecutors use companies’ attempts to 
hide bribes through dubious accounting to punish bribery attempts they would otherwise 
have difficulty proving.44 This technique means that on first examination, many of the 
cases involve seemingly mundane misallocation or awkward contortions of accounting 
categories.45 For example, in United States v. Rathrock, the Vice President of the Cooper 
Division of the Allied Products Corporation pleaded guilty to preparing a “false invoice”.  
This mundane sounding offense actually involved bribing a Russian firm to buy his 
company’s products in a complicated transaction involving Swiss companies and a non-
existent marketing study.46 A significant portion of the FCPA cases that are brought rely 
on accounting provisions like those involved in the Rathrock case.   
 A second tool of the FCPA, when attempting to overcome the challenges of 
proving violations by US companies, is to hold parent corporations directly responsible 
for the actions of their subsidiaries.  A good example of this liability was the SEC’s 
seeking civil injunctive and civil penalty enforcement against Triton Energy, on the basis 
of actions by its subsidiary, Triton Indonesia.  Unusually invoking the anti-bribery as 
well as the accounting provisions of the FCPA, the SEC held Triton Energy responsible 
for the decisions of two Triton Indonesia executives to authorize payments to an agent 
who then would go on to bribe Indonesian government officials to lower its tax bill and 
 
43 15 U.S.C. § §  78m(a), 78m(b) (2004). 
44 This roundabout route to law enforcement is not a new technique—Al Capone, for example, was 
convicted not for violating laws restricting the consumption of alcohol but for not paying taxes on these 
profits.  See Symposium, Jeffrey Rosen, Security, Technology and Individual Rights: 2003, 2 GEO. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 17, 27 (2003). 
45 See Stuart H. Deming, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: The Accounting and Record-Keeping 
Provisions, 2002 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L LAW & PRAC. 1, available at WL N02FCPB ABA-LGLED C-1 
46 See id.. 
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deal with other regulatory problems the business was facing.47 The SEC prosecuted 
despite its admission that Triton Energy officials had never given explicit authorization 
for the payment of the bribe money—all the negotiations were conducted via Triton 
Indonesia, with all of its assets and people found outside the United States.48 Triton 
Energy and its employees eventually consented to permanent injunctive relief and civil 
monetary penalties.49 This approach is certainly useful, and a strong encouragement to 
companies considering toughening internal audit and compliance rules.  But it still 
requires that the SEC or DOJ collect evidence about the actions of the subsidiaries before 
bringing a case to court (the Triton investigation itself took several years to complete and 
the case began in 1997—about six years after the last bribe involved in the case was 
paid).50 
A second notable aspect of the Triton case was that the SEC had evidence that 
Triton Indonesia had engaged in long-term “greasing” of low level individuals to ensure 
the timely processing of monthly crude oil invoices.  The SEC did not prosecute Triton 
for these payments (presumably because they were covered by the “routine 
administrative action” exception) thought it did add additional charges dealing with 
Triton’s attempts to hide the payments through improper accounting.51 These “grease” 
payments had occurred immediately before and during the period where the major 
bribery investigation began (the end of the 1980s and early 1990s)52—demonstrating that 
 
47 See SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., (Keever and McAdoo), [1996-1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) P 74,405 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 1997); Mathews, supra note 32 at 357-70.  
48 Mathews, supra note 32, at 357-58, 366-67. 
49 Id. at 366-67. 
50 Id. at 366. 
51 Id. at 365-66. 
52 Id.
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the corrupt culture of Triton Indonesia clearly extended to corruption at all levels, and 
challenging the idea that high level and administrative bribery are distinct. 
 b.  Symbolic Impact  
The relative rarity of enforcement actions under the FCPA,53 the difficulties in 
enforcement which even the law’s structure betrays,54 and the indignant context in which 
it was passed55 all underscore the fact that one of the major purposes of the FCPA’s 
prohibitions on bribery is to serve as a symbolic articulation of anti-corruption norms—
rather than a simple additional tool in the crime fighting arsenal.  
As previously outline, violations of the FCPA result in real prosecutions.  But even 
these can be seen as part of an effort to spread the fundamental symbolic message 
implied by the FCPA, rather than to significantly decrease the level of corruption one 
prosecution at a time.  The overall message implied by the emphasis on accounting 
information, on holding parent companies responsible for the actions of their subsidiaries, 
and even of structures like DOJ pre-opinions on the legality of certain payments,56 is one 
of deterrence.  The FCPA is designed to encourage companies to monitor their global 
activities closely and to articulate and enforce strong anti-corruption norms through 
internal compliance systems.  The criminal prosecutions that do occur serve as an 
additional stick by which to convince companies of the advisability of adopting these 
measures.   
When considering whether to eliminate the FCPA’s “grease” payments exemption, 
the actual role of the FCPA is of primary importance.  The most important question that 
 
53 See Eaton, supra note 32; Mathews, supra note 32, at 305.  
54 See discussion in section IIIa. 
55 See Posadas, supra note 8, at 349-55. 
56 15 USC 78dd-1 (e)(1) (2004). 
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needs to be answered is not whether facilitation payments can be eliminated through 
individual prosecutions by US authorities, but rather whether these payments are actually 
harmful and, if they are, whether the level of harm is high enough to justify including 
them in the anti-corruption norm that the FCPA expresses. 
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IV. Impact of Exemption 
There are two major negative impacts from the exclusion of “grease” money from the 
FCPA.  First, the exclusion encourages additional use of administrative bribes by major 
corporations.  Second, it carries important symbolic connotations—that the United States 
(and developed countries in general) cares only about certain types of bribery in 
developing countries, either for reasons of national interest or because “small scale” 
bribery is not destructive.   Before considering these effects though, it is necessary to 
outline the destructive impact that many economists assign to “small scale” bribery.  
Only then is the full damage caused by the exclusion of “grease” money from the FCPA 
appreciable. 
a.  Economic Impact of Grease Money 
 The exclusion of “grease” money/administrative payments from the FCPA was 
adopted as a way of improving the competitiveness of US firms abroad that had been 
handicapped by the inability to respond to foreign firms’ bribery and/or improve their 
ability to make other countries’ bureaucracies move faster.57 But the presence of the 
exemption strongly suggests that administrative corruption and small-scale payments are 
also not considered on the same scale as the large payments that are banned by the FCPA.  
This is in line with the views of certain academics who have suggested that small scale 
bribery is not a very important concern, or may indeed simply be a cultural practice not 
familiar to western businesses and thus needlessly categorized as harmful.58 But the 
 
57 See 123 CONG. REC. 38604-02, 38778, 36304 (statements of Senator Tower, Congressman Devine, and 
Congressman Eckhardt, respectively); Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment 
Disclosure Hearings on S. 305 Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977). 
58 See, e.g., Lui’s argument that in some cases bribery can mean the most efficient allocation of resources 
(e.g. to those who need them most).  Frances Lui, An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery, 93 JOURNAL 
OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 760 (1985).  From a practitioners standpoint, George Moody-Stuart suggests that 
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majority of economic and development experts who have reviewed the subject do not 
agree.59 These experts argue that “small scale” bribery is extremely harmful, with some 
firms’ payment of “greasing” money increasing the pressure on other firms to pay 
them—with the result that all firms waste additional time engaging with bureaucrats as 
part of the bribery payment and avoidance dance.  Additional studies have argued that 
these administrative payments do not actually increase firm growth, but are rather a result 
of pressure from bureaucrats.  Some economists go further than this--they argue that 
administrative corruption at a low level may be even more harmful than concentrated, 
high level corruption.  While these studies do not establish the exact relation between 
“grease” payments and other forms of corruption, they do refute the implication that the 
“grease” payments authorized by the FCPA are relatively harmless. 
 One key study of administrative corruption, co-authored by the head of the World 
Bank’s governance programs, relevantly considers whether “Grease Money Speeds Up 
the Wheels of Commerce?”.60 This study, using surveys of global corporations, found a 
positive correlation between bribe payments and official harassment (e.g. time wasted 
with bureaucracy, regulatory burden etc.)—suggesting that overall, paying bribes did not 
decreased the level of official harassment for firms on an economy-wide basis.61 Rather, 
the authors suggest that bureaucrats can use the willingness of firms to pay bribes to 
 
“small gifts” (generally defined as 2% of the value of a contract or $20,000, whichever is less), should be 
allowed without question. See George Moody-Stuart, GRAND CORRUPTION 59-60 (1997). 
59 Generally, these studies discuss issues like “grease money”, small scale corruption and administrative 
corruption rather than sticking to the exact language of the FCPA and its subsequent interpretations.  But 
the general category of payment being discussed is the same, making the use of these studies valid for 
considering the general issue of “grease money”. 
60 Daniel Kauffman and Shang-Jin Wei, Does Grease Money Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?, (World 
Bank, 1998).  Amusingly, the paper makes approving reference to the FCPA’s general prohibition on 
corruption in discussing its conclusion that administrative payments are harmful…the exact category of 
bribes which the FCPA is less stringent in enforcing. 
61 Id., at 8-12, 15-16. 
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extract an even higher level of rents than they would otherwise be able to.62 This low 
level harassment and time-wasting is exactly the type of burden that the FCPA’s 
exemptions on “grease” money seems designed to avoid.  On an individual level, firms’ 
decisions to pay bribes can make sense.  On an economy wide level, the 
ability/willingness of firms to pay small scale bribes contributes to a large-scale problem 
where the entire economy’s growth rate is reduced by additional resources spent 
engaging and satisfying the bureaucracy.  The study’s authors conclude that “the business 
community as a whole can benefit from international laws that strengthen their ability to 
credibly commit to no-bribery…[s]uch laws may not only reduce bribe payment, but may 
also reduce the actual harassment firms face in equilibrium”.63 
The problematic nature of administrative bribery is also demonstrated by a more 
extensive study of state capture conducted by the World Bank.  Examining the results of 
a major survey in Eastern Europe, the World Bank experts on governance and corruption 
found that firms which paid high levels of administrative action bribes (e.g. bribes to “get 
things done” as opposed to influencing the formation of regulatory and legislative 
frameworks) suffered from lower levels of growth and invested less money into their 
businesses.64 While the causes of this correlation are acknowledged as complex, the 
authors’ argue that “[a]dministrative corruption…would appear…to impose considerable 
costs to the firm without any measurable benefits”.65 The same study found that other 
forms of corruption could, in certain cases, have significant benefits to the firms that 
 
62 Id. at 15. 
63 Id. at 16. 
64 Joel S. Hellman et al., “Seize the State, Seize the Day”: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in 
Transition 19 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 2444, 2000). 
65 Id.
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engaged in them.  Administrative corruption, on the other hand, seemed to benefit only 
the bureaucrats who extracted rents.66 
Other economists have suggested that low-level type bribes can, under certain 
conditions, be more costly and destructive than the centralized, high level bribes targeted 
by the FCPA.67 While those making this argument admit that corruption is determined 
by a large number of variables, they argue that high-level corruption, combined with a 
reasonably compliant and paid civil service, can in certain cases produce less of an 
impact than uncontrolled corruption at all levels.68 This insight into the nature of 
corruption is confirmed by other researchers, who discuss differences between India and 
Suharto-era Indonesia.69 While the total level of corruption in both countries was 
relatively similar, growth rates were much lower in India.  This may have been because 
corruption in India was more anarchic and non-centralized, and thus less predictable and 
more time consuming for firms.70 In some ways, it can be less costly to firms to make a 
few dependable, large scale payments to top officials than to deal with the constant 
demand for small scale bribes by low level officials.71 
These economic studies, like all others, are not all-encompassing.  The formal 
economic models they contain are premised on large numbers of assumptions, and the 
large surveys used for statistical information are not specifically focused on the exact 
 
66 Id. at 17-19.  This study included both foreign and domestic firms in the countries studied.  But the same 
authors have debunked the idea that foreign firms might be more “virtuous” than domestic ones, and thus 
not subject to the survey’s conclusions.  In a companion paper, they found that foreign firms were just as 
likely to engage in administrative corruption as domestic firms.  Joel Hellman et. al, Are Foreign Investors 
and Multinationals Engaging in Corrupt Practices in Transition Economies?, TRANSITION, May-June-July 
2000, at 3. 
67 Christopher J. Waller et. al, Corruption:  Top Down or Bottom Up?, 40 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 688 (2002). 
68 Id. at 688, 699-702. 
69 Bardhan, supra note 1. 
70 Id. at 1325. 
71 See Andrew MacIntyre, Funny Money:  Fiscal Policy, Rent-seeking and Economic Performance in 
Indonesia, in RENTS, RENT-SEEKING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 249 (Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo 
Kwame Sundaram eds., 2000). 
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conditions contained in the FCPA.  But the overall message of these surveys, and many 
other, more general reviews of corruption,72 suggest that small scale payments do have a 
significant cost—for the individual firms that pay them, for the general business 
environment and for society as a whole.  This absolute cost is an argument for amending 
the FCPA to include a ban on “grease” payments, regardless of whether other types of 
bribes are more or less destructive on a comparative basis. 
b. Symbolic Impact 
The symbolic impact of the FPCA’s exception for “grease” payments may be even 
more significant than the additional administrative payments that result because they are 
exempted from coverage under the act.  As discussed earlier, the FCPA has been a model 
and a standard against which anti-corruption campaigners have measured themselves (or 
been pressured to do so by a powerful United States).  In this context, many of the major 
possible explanations for the current FCPA exemption for grease payments are 
destructive.  One would be that the United States doesn’t consider grease payments 
particularly problematic, and thus that developed countries need not take the fight against 
them seriously either.  A second explanation would be that the inconvenience of avoiding 
low level corruption is so great that it outweighs any negative impact on other countries’ 
economies and societies.  A related argument is that the United States feels that engaging 
in higher level corruption has problematic impacts on its own firms (and country), 
whereas lower level corruption would not do that—impacting only other countries.  
These explanations are overlapping and complementary, united in detracting from efforts 
to fight administrative corruption and in reinforcing negative views of the United States. 
 
72 See, e.g.,  Wei supra note 1; Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 681 (1995).   
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The first explanation for the FCPA’s exemption of “grease payments”—that the 
United States doesn’t consider “grease” payments particularly problematic—is supported 
by both the history of the FCPA and the language of the exemption and its 
implementation.  The FCPA was passed in response to high level corruption by US 
companies, mostly in order to secure contracts with foreign governments.73 Coming in 
the wake of the Watergate scandals that had forced President Nixon to resign, the 
investigations into corporate malfeasance focused on the corruption of the very highest 
public officials and the damage this did to confidence in the United States business 
system.74 In this context, low level administrative payments and their destructive impact 
were not very relevant to the legislators’ actions.  This view is supported by reviewing 
the language of the exemption and its implementation.  It stops enforcement of the 
FCPA’s provisions while expediting or securing “routine governmental action”75—
basically distinguishing between firms getting government officials to do “what they are 
supposed to do” and other types of corruption. 
 The rationales behind the distinctions that the FCPA makes are appealing at first 
glance.  But as the studies outlined in the previous sub-section make clear, the “grease” 
money that the FCPA privileges is actually highly destructive to both the business 
environment and the successful operation of the actual firms involved.  By allowing its 
legislation to make the case that administrative corruption is not a serious (or as serious) 
a problem as other types of bribery, the United States plays a destructive role in anti-
 
73 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions (discussing background 
of the FCPA), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ criminal/fraud/ fcpa/dojdocb.htm (last updated March 15, 
2002); Klich, supra note 38 at 123-24. 
74 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions (discussing background 
of the FCPA), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ criminal/fraud/ fcpa/dojdocb.htm (last updated March 15, 
2002). 
75 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1(b), 2(b) (as amended by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107). 
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corruption efforts in other countries and at an international level.  While it is doubtful that 
those wishing to engage in bribery would directly point to the United States for 
justification, it is very possible that laws to combat corruption would borrow from the 
FCPA—and include the laxer treatment of administrative corruption.  The real possibility 
of this was illustrated by the fact that the OECD treaty on corruption adopted the same 
exemption to administrative payments as the FCPA.76 More generally, the United States 
role as a leader in the anti-corruption movement means that its legal system is widely 
studied by anti-corruption experts from other countries, particularly developing ones.77 
Given its relevance to the international community, the FCPA’s prescriptions and value 
judgments are likely to be particularly studied—and thus the exemption for “grease” 
payments particularly destructive. 
A second possible explanation of the FCPA exemption reinforces the idea of the 
United States as a hypocrite.  Those trying to protect corruption (and/or attack the United 
States) can point to the exemption and claim that it reveals a self-interested and selfish 
United States that values the convenience of its own firms rather than the smooth 
functioning of other countries societies.  In this scenario (supported by the text of the 
FCPA’s exemption, with its discussion of “routine governmental action”)78 the United 
States refuses to place its firms in the (undoubtedly, sometimes inconvenient position) of 
having to accept the official channels and delays that normal, law-abiding members of the 
public must.  While petty bribery is certainly a fact of life in many countries,79 the 
 
76 See OECD Convention, supra note 4.   
77 See, e.g., Govt Studying Steps to Avoid Bribery of University Staff, THE DAILY YOMIURI, Jun. 1, 1999 at 
3; Ethiopia Participates in Global Forum to Fight Corruption, ADDIS TRIBUNE, Mar. 5, 1999; Michael 
Sun, Scholar Lauds anti-graft Academy Move, NEW STRAITS TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003 at 12. 
78 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1(b). 
79 See, e.g., Klich, supra note 38, at 131-32. 
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specifically articulated exception for United States bribers has the potential to aggravate 
feelings already made raw by United States actions after the September 11 terrorist 
attacks.80 
A third, related argument, is that the FCPA exception reflects a United States that 
cares only about its domestic affairs.  Under this line of criticism, the FCPA was passed 
at a time when the United States was worried about high level corruption 
domestically81—and that the FCPA was meant to stop large US companies from 
becoming accustom to high level bribery abroad.  Under this view, the FCPA exemption 
would simply exclude types of bribery not held to be particularly dangerous to the US 
domestically. 
Neither of the last two lines of attack would be as effective if the United States was 
quietly content to focus on its internal affairs—after all, many European countries until 
recently allowed tax deductions on bribery abroad.  The difference is that US foreign 
policy rhetoric consistently aspires to much higher standards for the United States.  Given 
its claims to be a “city on the hill”, especially in regards to corruption, the United States 
is much more vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy than other countries.  The moralistic 
rhetoric surrounding corruption implicitly and explicitly boasts that the United States is 
more ethical and correct than the rest of the world.  In this context, issues like the FCPA 
exemption have the capacity to severely undermine the effectiveness of US foreign 
policy.82 At least in the case of corruption, this would be problematic not just for the 
 
80 Ranging from the Iraq war to tightening visa restrictions. 
81 See, e.g., Klich, supra note 38, at 123-24; Adler supra note 8 at 1740-41. 
82 For example, President Clinton, on signing amendments to the FCPA, stated that:  “The United States 
has led the effort to curb international bribery. We have long believed bribery is inconsistent with 
democratic values, such as good governance and the rule of law. It is also contrary to basic principles of 
fair competition and harmful to efforts to promote economic development.”.  William J. Clinton, Statement 
by the President, (Nov. 10, 1998) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/signing.htm. 
27
United States, but also from the rest of the world, which would benefit from anti-
corruption standards equal to those US rhetoric lauds.  
 
[hereinafter Clinton Speech]; Simons, supra note 15; Bill Brock, Prohibit Bribery-Not Exports, CHR. SCI.
MON., Sep. 9, 1981 at 22. (“Congress acted in a typically courageous and American fashion when it passed 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in December 1977”).  The FCPA’s scope for undermining US 
rhetoric is particularly strong given the fact that other major trading powers—like France and Japan—
choose not to protect their firms with a facilitation payment exclusion, despite being allowed to by the 
OECD convention.  See, OECD, FRANCE: PHASE 1 REPORT 6 (2000); OECD, JAPAN: PHASE 1 REPORT 3
(2002).  While this legal framework does not mean that all prosecutors don’t turn a blind eye, the legal 
principle claimed has significant symbolic and rhetorical value. 
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V.  Classifying Low-Level Administrative Corruption 
 
Corruption is notoriously difficult to define.83 Similarly, it is difficult to identity the 
exact parameters of low-level administrative corruption.84 Beyond the vague outlines 
sketched by the FCPA and the OECD convention, little attention has been given to 
systematically classifying these low-level bribes.  While it could be argued that the small 
amounts involved in low-level corruption render any classification attempt low value, it 
is important to conduct such an exercise before considering a complete ban, as this paper 
does.  Thinking systematically about the various categories these low-level payments 
might be classified under helps to determine whether a total ban on payments is 
warranted or whether only some facilitation payments create the serious harms that have 
been associated with this type of bribe.  More broadly, this exercise can further illustrate 
the various ways in which low-level “facilitation” payments can lead to significant harms 
that a repeal of the FCPA exemption would begin to prevent. 
 In terms of exemptions from prosecution, the FCPA’s text refers to an “[e]xception 
for routine government action”, while the commentary of the OECD convention exempts 
“facilitation payments…made to induce public officials to perform their functions”.85 
The FCPA’s exemption has been interpreted to cover only amounts less than $1000, 
though this is not stated in the statute’s text.86 But beyond these vague parameters there 
are very few definitions.  Using the parameters provided by the OECD and the FCPA, a 
first classification attempt of payments to facilitate routine government action would 
probably focus on the amounts involved, and/or the frequency of bribery, as well as the 
 
83 See, e.g., Arvind K. Jain, Corruption:  A Review, 15 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, 71, 73 (2001). 
84 Indeed, this has been one source of criticism of the FCPA—that its definitions, including those related to 
the facilitation payment exemption, are too vague.  See, e.g., Taylor supra note 35 at 874-77. 
85 OECD Convention, supra note 4 at Commentaries, para. 9. 
86 See Perkel, supra note 9 at 697. 
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exact definition of what payments for “routine government action” actually constitute.  
More sophisticated classifications might focus on the “moral” wrong of various 
payments, the type of activity regulated, the amounts involved and the possibility that 
low level administrative bribery will lead to additional corruption.  All of these potential 
classification systems need to be judged on two distinct factors:  how easily they would 
allow corrupt payments to be distinguished from each other, and how useful the resulting 
classifications would be. 
 Before beginning to consider how to sub-divide the different types of payments 
that would be affected by amending the FCPA, it is important to outline what payments 
are currently covered by the exemption for “routine governmental action”.87 While this is 
a vague term, it is generally held to cover activities that foreign officials would normally 
perform during the course of their duties, and over which they theoretically do not 
exercise much discretion over.  This could include activities like issuing permits and 
other documents necessary to do business; providing/arranging for utility provision; 
processing requests, and other basic bureaucratic procedures.  Routine governmental 
action would not include performing tasks not included as part of an everyday job 
description—e.g. waiving mandatory fees or (especially) approving contracts for new 
business.88 The lines between routine governmental action and new/impermissible 
business are not always clear-cut.  For example, VAT repayments a US company was 
legally entitled to would seem to fall within the scope of the exemption.  But Justice 
Department lawyers have indicated that they would consider this kind of payment 
problematic—probably because the payment might be seen as a way or retaining business 
 
87 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-1(b) (2000). 
88 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-579, at 921 (1988) (describing routine governmental action exception); 
15 U.S.C. § 78f-3(a) (2000); Mathews, supra note 32 at 314. 
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and possibly because the official would exercise discretion in deciding which company’s 
payments would be processed first.89 
In addition to qualitative descriptions of permitted activities, the FCPA exemption 
has an unwritten quantitative limitation as well.  Payments over $1000 are generally 
considered to be highly problematic at best, and will almost certainly attract close 
attention during any investigation.  Though there is no textual support for this limitation 
in the statute, most practitioners accept that this limitation exists.90 While these 
parameters are not iron clad, they do allow a general view of the types of payments 
included under the FCPA exemption, and permit some discussion of different ways to 
classify and consider the different payments currently allowed. 
A first approach to sub-dividing different types of FCPA allowed payments would 
focus on which payments were “moral” and which were not.  The attractiveness of this 
general approach is simple—as long as no specifics are mentioned, it permits all who 
consider this classification to stigmatize only those payments they see as harmful.  For 
example, businesspeople could imagine this classification tolerating payments in cases 
where perishable goods would rot unless a corrupt official was given a small payment to 
allow the goods ashore—while frowning on those who delay everyone else’s visa 
applications by monopolizing an official’s time with their own employees’ issues.  In a 
more general sense, the moral differentiation would often give a free pass to bribe payers 
who otherwise face significant losses through no fault of their own (e.g. officials who 
refuse to work as they are supposed to until they are bribed) while punishing those whose 
 
89 Mathews, supra note 32 at 315.  Matthews points out that speeding processing of certain applicants 
almost inevitably leads to discretionary choices about whose documents should be processed first—and 
disagrees with the rationale of the DOJ lawyers who responded to this hypothetical.  This disagreement 
illustrates the continuing confusion that the FCPA exemption can cause. 
90 Compare 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-1(b) (2000) with Mathews supra note 32 at 315 n.22.   
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bribes have negative consequences for others (e.g. monopolizing an official’s time and 
thus slowing down document processing for everyone else).  In theory, this kind of 
differentiation is very justifiable—punishing those who try to improve conditions at the 
expense of others, while giving a free pass to those who are simply trying to do business 
in a difficult environment and face significant losses if they don’t conform to local 
expectations. 
 The problem with the moral approach is two fold—in the first place, there will be 
strong disagreements about what is “moral” in the first place.  Some commentators would 
argue that contributing to a culture of corruption is immoral in the first place, in essence 
eliminating all bribes.  Other groups might consider the intentions of those paying and 
receiving the bribes.  Less ambitious planners would only punish actions that had a direct 
negative impact on others, whatever the impact on an overall culture.  But even if this 
disagreement were resolved in favor of the last category, it would be enormously difficult 
to distinguish which payments had the negative consequences the law targeted.  For 
example, in the case of payments for expedited document processing, it would be hard to 
determine whether an official was slowing the processing of others’ documents or simply 
putting in extra work.  In some senses, the FCPA exemption’s current emphasis on 
“routine governmental action” already tries to make this “moral” distinction between 
officials choosing one applicant over another and simply “doing their job”.  Continuing 
ambiguity over what can be counted in this category underscores the fact that any kind of 
“moral” distinction between facilitation payments would be very hard to codify or 
enforce. 
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 A different approach to differentiating the payments currently allowed by the 
FCPA would concentrate on more concrete issues than morality—making distinctions 
between they different categories of service for which facilitation payments are made.  
The attractiveness of this approach is that the apparently distinct nature of service 
categories theoretically permits clearer guidance about which payments are allowed (and 
clearer debate about what circumstances deserve an exemption and which do not). One 
way of considering different categories of action is using the four basic categories of 
“routine governmental action” identified by the FCPA:  obtaining permits and similar 
documents; processing government papers like visas; providing services like police 
protection, mail delivery and the like; and providing utilities, loading/unloading cargo 
and protecting perishable goods.91 
It could be argued that the latter two categories in the FCPA definition are very 
different from the two former ones.  Police protection and utility provision can be crucial 
to the health and safety of affected businesses’ employees, and the delays of one corrupt 
official who refuses to protect perishable goods can lead to entire shipments being ruined, 
with serious economic consequences.  In addition, in theory at least, providing utilities 
and police protection doesn’t directly harm other potential beneficiaries…since the 
resources would have to be allocated in some way anyway.  Under this view, the 
payments’ contribution to a culture of corruption are the only real negatives—and this is 
a problem best dealt with at a level that does not endanger health/safety or current 
shipments of melting chocolates.  On the contrary, some delays in issuing permits do not 
directly endanger the health/safety of individuals or cause immediate economic damage. 
 
91 15 U.S.C. §  78f-3(a) (2000).  The distinctiveness of these categories could be disputed.  It would be easy 
to sketch a scenario where utility provision and police protection are intimately connected with the 
processing of government papers and issuance of appropriate permits. 
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But these distinctions hold true only some of the time.  Utility provision, for 
example, is not an infinite resource and providing it to foreign investors and the like can 
often mean that other (often poorer and more vulnerable) consumers receive less.  Thus 
choosing to provide electric power to the district where foreign investors have their 
houses and offices can mean that poorer regions of the city are provided with less power.  
In the case of perishable goods, providing facilities to one shipment can mean that 
another shipment does not receive the protection it needs—meaning that some goods 
perish anyway.  Additionally, utilities and security can be privately provided for those 
with economic power (e.g. buying an electric generator or hiring a security guard) while 
documents like visas and export permits cannot be replicated by the private sector (unless 
serious crimes like document fraud are committed).  Delays in issuing documents and 
permits can also cause significant economic losses if they mean that machinery or other 
assets sit idle for lack of spare parts, personnel or permission to operate—losses that 
could be greater than the loss of a vegetable shipment.   
The overall problem with trying to distinguish broad categories of government 
service as more or less appropriate to facilitation payments is that there are plausible 
counter-narratives to virtually any classification.  The specifics of any situation where 
bribes are paid are so diverse that generalizations can fall flat on their face.  While 
defining different categories of “routine governmental action” is easier than classifying 
these actions’ “moral” consequences, it is very difficult to justify a conclusion that 
facilitation payments are generally appropriate to a category or not. 
 A third potential way of classifying facilitation payments does away with any 
attempt to differentiate between different categories of payment.  Instead, it focuses 
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purely on the amount paid—allowing payments under a certain amount or percentage of a 
contract’s value and forbidding those over this amount.92 This proposal would in effect 
expand the FCPA’s exemption in at least some ways, in the name of establishing clear 
boundaries of what behavior would be allowed and what would not.  The clarity of this 
type of exemption seems preferable to the current ambiguity concerning which payments 
are allowed and which are not.  But this differentiation ignores the large number of 
negative impacts that even small-scale corruption can have—as detailed in Section IV 
and the previous discussion in this Section.  In this sense, the easier classification would 
be awarded at the expense of potentially increasing the scope of activities where bribery 
would be allowed.   
Beyond the immediate moral and practical difficulties caused by expanding the 
range of unpunished corruption, establishing either a dollar or percentage of contract 
limit could have perverse side effects.  In both cases, it could lead to implicit 
international recognition of “permissible” bribe levels—potentially increasing the 
predictability of bribe costs but also making it much harder to eliminate in the long run 
(and risking the spread of the new “standard”).  A dollar limit risks holding large business 
contracts to more stringent standards than smaller ones (as a dollar limit would be a 
higher percentage of smaller contracts than larger ones).  This might be seen as a benefit 
(as larger investors theoretically can resist pressure to bribe more easily than smaller 
 
92 This classification has been proposed by a number of commentators.  See, e.g., Moody-Stuart, supra note 
58 at 59-60 (suggesting amounts of $20,000 or less); Mathews, supra note 32 at 315 n.22 (quoting a 
Congressman who unsuccessfully proposed a $5000 or $10,000 limit). 
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investors) but is a broad policy choice whose consequences and potential side effects 
require serious consideration.93 
A final potential classification would attempt to differentiate between small-scale 
bribes on the basis of the likelihood that this type of corruption would lead to larger scale 
corruption.  Thus bribes that would lead to demands for larger payments or demands for 
payments from others would be banned, whereas small facilitation payments that simply 
maintained the status quo would be allowed.  Obviously, bribes that cause additional 
losses to other investors are more harmful than bribes that simply contribute to the 
maintenance of a given level of corruption. 
The major challenge to classifying bribes that lead to additional corruption is not 
in the use of the category but in its derivation.  It would be very hard to prove in a court 
(or even outside a court) whether a bribe maintained the status quo.  Theoretically, bribes 
that were higher than average or provided in a sector not known for bribery would be the 
main targets.  But identifying the average bribe for a comparable transaction is a very 
specific data point.  While general testimony on this subject might be obtainable, it would 
be hard to corroborate.  The same holds true when defining sectors where corruption 
existed or did not.  Given the difficulties encountered in proving corruption abroad 
anyway, sub-dividing corrupt payments by potential to harm seems like a lost cause—and 
anyway ignores culpability for supporting a corrupt status quo.  The general principle that 
the harm caused by bribes should be considered can of course be one factor taken into 
account—but the place for this consideration is probably a prosecutor’s office, when 
decisions about which cases to devote resources to are made. 
 
93 Theoretically, this could push private companies to engage in only low level/low value contracts in 
developing countries in order to decrease the probability of legal liability for bribery—or alternatively 
channel multiple bribes just under the FCPA’s new limits… 
36
 Most potential sub-divisions of the low-level administrative bribery currently 
permitted by the FCPA are either relatively easy to classify bribes into or would be useful 
categories to consider—but none actually meet both criteria.  Categories that would be 
particularly useful in amending the FCPA’s current exemption for low-level 
administrative payments—like the degree to which a given bribe might encourage 
additional corruption—are particularly subjective and difficult to assess.  Categories 
marked by relatively clear boundaries—like the type of service purchased—are not 
clearly differentiated in terms of the harm they cause.  In this sense, it seems more 
efficient and fairer to ban all administrative bribery, given the fact that there are some 
negative consequences associated with all these payments.  Prosecutors could then use 
their discretion to address the most egregious cases—whatever form they presented 
themselves in.94 
94 Giving prosecutors discretion brings up additional issues relating to their potential biases.  But as the 
discussion in this section indicates, the most harmful kinds of corruption can be found scattered across any 
of the categories low-level administrative corruption could realistically be sub-divided into.  Criminalizing 
only some of these categories would be a relatively random attack that would reach only some of the most 
harmful corruption.  Ensuring that prosecutorial discretion is widely used is a broader challenge for society 
that goes beyond the specifics of this proposal.  
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VI. Amending the FCPA 
Given both the corrosive impact of administrative corruption, its deleterious 
impact on the United States’ role as an anti-corruption crusader, and the difficulties 
inherent in trying to separate out less harmful low-level administrative payments, the 
FCPA’s exemption for “grease” payments should be eliminated.  The United States 
should also take a lead in lobbying for the OECD anti-corruption treaty to be amended in 
a similar fashion.  This proposal will almost certainly help to reduce the amount of 
administrative corruption in countries outside the United States.  On an immediate level, 
general corporate compliance policies will almost certainly be changed to reflect the new 
legal framework.  Though this will certainly not solve the problem, it will be a significant 
step in changing practices surrounding administrative corruption.  More broadly, the 
attack on administrative corruption could be the basis of renewed efforts to attack 
corruption in general.  The United States’ effort to have other countries sign the OECD 
anti-corruption convention helped to spur the increasing disapproval of corruption 
exemplified by the work of Transparency International and the World Bank’s increased 
emphasis on tackling corruption in the countries it supports.  US firms will certainly 
lobby their government to pressure other countries to take similar steps to crack down on 
administrative corruption.  Freed from the shackles of its current hypocritical laws, US 
rhetoric and pressure might be even more effective, and could eventually help lead to 
large reductions in administrative corruption on a global level. 
Removing the FCPA exemption for “grease” payments will lead to tangible 
benefits.  Most directly, it will provide US companies operating abroad with a weighty 
reason for refusing to pay administrative bribes, providing additional assistance in 
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avoiding payments that World Bank research suggests have little or no benefit in the long 
term for private corporations.95 Broader international action on the issue could provide 
an impetus for reducing the leeway of bureaucrats everywhere to exert pressure for 
additional rents from firms.  Removing the clause from the FCPA will also increase 
pressure on the US government to become even more involved in reducing corruption 
worldwide while improving its effectiveness at the task. 
Of course, removing the exemption for “grease” payments will lead to real 
inconveniences for US companies, especially in the short term.  Additional concerns that 
will need to be addressed include questions about how bans on low level payments can be 
enforced, whether this type of rule will deflect US investors from “high bribe” countries; 
whether this type of ban is so sweeping as to ignore non-western cultural traditions; and 
whether the ban would in other ways skew current bribery patterns in a way that made it 
even more harmful than currently.  Some of the objections—especially those centered on 
short-term business impairment and enforceability—are valid and problematic, but they 
can be addressed in a way that reduces some of the negative impact.  More broadly 
however, these objections are not sufficient to outweigh the tangible, long-term benefits 
of removing the “grease” money exception from the FCPA. 
a. Benefits 
One of the most immediate benefits of eliminating the FCPA exemption clause 
will be reduced administrative bribery on the part of US companies.  The FCPA 
exemption will provide additional support for corporate “no bribery” policies and also 
provide a reasonable explanation for refusing to engage in administrative bribery both 
externally and internally.  Externally, companies will be able to provide a comprehensible 
 
95 Hellman, supra note 64 at 19. 
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explanation to corrupt bureaucrats about why they refuse to provide administrative 
bribes.  Instead of referring to obviously ill-enforced written domestic laws or corporate 
level policies, they will be able to refer to the danger of prosecution by the United States.  
Given the fact that bureaucrats opportunistically engage in rent seeking behavior that 
maximizes returns rather than responding to firm level pressure for changes, possessing 
an excuse for not bribing may decrease the overall level of bribe collection somewhat.  
More broadly, any leeway still available in internal policies written to comply with 
external laws will be removed, making official company policies even more stringently 
opposed to corruption. 
A second positive impact of removing the FCPA exemption will be to empower 
employees of large companies to actively refuse participation in administrative 
corruption.  Whereas previously they might be cowed by explanations of “local tradition” 
and the fact that the bribes are not illegal under US law, removing the exemption will 
provide them with a concrete reason to refuse participation in this type of administrative 
corruption:  it could expose them to criminal prosecution in the United States.  Providing 
rationales like these might like a relatively artificial construct for reducing bribery, but 
each additional rationale that helps companies and individuals refuse to participate in 
bribery can make the difference in reducing at least some administrative corruption. 
 The broader and more general benefit of removing the FCPA exemption will be 
the possibility of reinforcing current anti-corruption activities at a global level.  As 
discussed previously, the United States and the FCPA in particular have been leaders in 
the anti-corruption struggle.  Their ability to be more effective against the whole range of 
corruption should not be underestimated.  More specifically, the United States will almost 
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certainly pressure other countries to both amend the OECD convention to remove the 
exemption for administrative corruption contained there and lobby other countries 
individually to stop their firms from paying “grease” money.  US firms, as they did in the 
case of the OECD convention,96 will certainly pressure their government to engage in this 
type of lobbying.  With full United States engagement, there is a real opportunity that 
other governments and international institutions will join in a crack down on 
administrative corruption.  Given the significant absence of long-term benefits found by 
economic surveys,97 any reductions in corruption would be a significant global benefit to 
all parties except corrupt civil servants.   
 The benefits of cracking down on administrative corruption may not be limited to 
this type of payment.  Legally demanding a wholesale ban on any corrupt payments, 
rather than creeping around painstaking exemptions (“grease” payments under $1000 for 
example…) could create a more robust anti-corruption culture on the part of both 
governments and international institutions.  Anti-corruption rhetoric and action is 
particularly steeped in moral disapproval,98 which makes any deviation particularly 
noticeable.  Anti-corruption messages backed by coherent legal frameworks should be 
much more convincing when it is not littered with caveats and exemptions.  Thus, 
eliminating the exemption could improve not just the effectiveness of campaigns against 
low-level administrative bribes but also reduce all types of corruption, including the high 
level payments originally targeted by those who passed the FCPA. 
 
96 See, e.g., George, supra note 39 at 495-96; David E. Sanger, Business Bribes to Foreigners to be Banned 
by End of 1998, NY TIMES, May 24, 1997 at 33.  
97 See, e.g., Wei supra note 1.  
98 See, e.g., Clinton Speech, supra note 82; Brock, supra note 82.  
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 A final potential positive impact of eliminating the FCPA exemption clause is the 
possibility that US companies will work harder to eliminate administrative corruption in 
countries where they operate.  Under current regulations, un- or under-enforced local 
corruption laws can be ignored in the case of low-level administrative bribes, with low-
level administrative corruption tolerated as a simple “additional cost” of doing business.  
If US companies suddenly find that the potential costs of paying these “low-level” bribes 
increases, they will have additional incentives to work towards eliminative administrative 
corruption.  Especially in countries where US multinationals have a significant presence, 
they can use their influence to encourage the adoption and enforcement of anti-corruption 
programs—helping to level any uneven playing field created when foreign rivals are 
subject to less stringent OECD convention regulations.99 While the companies’ direct 
interest may be limited to reducing demands for payments on themselves, many actions 
they could take to reduce this pressure would have positive benefits on other government 
service users.  This is especially the case in situations where US multinationals are 
significant actors in specific economies.100 
b. Immediate Challenges 
The most significant challenge to efforts to curb administrative bribery of the sort 
covered by the FCPA exemption is that it will prove impossible or extremely difficult to 
operate in countries within which petty corruption is endemic.  The potential reduction in 
investment might hurt not only US investors and businesses but also developing countries 
 
99 Hopefully, this imbalance will swiftly be ended by amendment to the OECD convention.  But at least in 
the short term, the imbalance will be an extra spur to US companies encouraging the development of 
programs that target small scale administrative corruption. 
100 There is also the possibility that this kind of pressure will simply lead to additional payment demands 
being leveled on foreign investors facing less restrictive laws in their own home countries.  But any such 
pressure may lead to these same companies supporting legislative reform to criminalize the payment of 
even low-level administrative bribes—a positive side effect to a side effect…. 
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whose economic development may be slowed by a reduction in foreign investment.  It is 
undoubtedly true that US companies and their employees will face significant 
inconvenience in the short and medium term when complying with the newly stringent 
regulation.  There is also the question of what will happen in extreme circumstances 
where employees are faced with death or serious injury unless they make a payment.  But 
as will be discussed below, the inconvenience facing US companies from ending 
administrative bribes of $1000 or less is a significant but not insurmountable obstacle, 
and one that doesn’t outweigh the real benefit flowing to both corporations and individual 
societies from an eventual reduction in administrative corruption. 
While administrative delays can be frustrating and inconvenient, it is unlikely that 
a large number of projects/business deals would be destroyed by the criminalization of 
payments currently covered by the FCPA exemption.  The exemption for “grease” 
payments is generally considered to apply only to payment of $1000 or less.101 While 
this can be a large amount of money in some developing countries, it is not likely to be a 
large sum relative to the size of most American business deals abroad.  Given the size of 
most business deals involving US companies outside the United States, most are unlikely 
to be completely cancelled simply because of the delays a $1,000 bribe would have 
prevented.  If the project really is dependent on such a slim reed, its problems probably 
are based on much more than administrative delays resulting from a refusal to pay small 
amounts of “grease” money.  
Increased frustration, delays and monetary losses to certain investors are the more 
likely result of the repeal of the FCPA exemption.  In some cases, the sum total of these 
will be so great that projects will be cancelled.  But this type of cancellation seems much 
 
101 See Avi-Yonah supra note 8 at 315. 
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less likely than cancellations resulting from the ban on large-scale bribery of foreign 
government officials.  Not paying millions of dollars to win a bid for government 
procurement is more detrimental to a project’s chances than a refusal to pay an occasional 
customs bribe.  In many senses, the United States has already made the decision that it is 
willing to risk real short-term losses to its firms by ending most types of bribes.  
Extending this to the more minor consequences resulting from a failure to pay small 
bribes is only consistent.102 
Additionally, firms that develop reputations for not bribing often find that they are 
less pressured to make corrupt payments than would otherwise be the case.103 While in 
the short term, US corporations and their employees will certainly be inconvenienced by 
not abiding by local bribe paying norms, they may eventually benefit from a reduction in 
pressure to pay bribes if they adhere to the new FCPA consistently.  This obviously 
benefits larger investors with repeated investor patterns more than smaller, newer 
investors, but is still a significant potential benefit.  
A potential objection to the payment of small bribes is the possibility that those 
who pay them may face explicit or implicit threats of death or injury unless they make 
small payments at roadblocks etc. in developing countries.  But in a situation like this, 
where there is a threat of physical violence, the payment is not actually a bribe—rather, it 
is robbery.  Additionally, the SEC and Justice department are unlikely to prosecute 
 
102 This does not mean that, in the short term, those adhering to these policies will not face major 
aggravation.  Everything from setting up utilities to getting permits will take extra time.   But aggravation 
and delays for US citizens and their employees in the short term seems an acceptable price to pay for the 
benefits of reducing corruption. 
103 For example, Texaco has developed such a strong reputation in West Africa for refusing to bribe that its 
jeeps are routinely waved through border crossings at which other vehicles are stopped and pressured for 
bribes.  See Philip M. Nichols, Bribery and Other Types of Corruption Threaten the Global Marketplace 
(U. of Pennsylvania,), at http://www.ameinfo.com/news/Detailed/24835.html. 
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payments like these, especially if the circumstances are carefully documented and 
honestly represented. 
 A second set of concerns about eliminating the FCPA exemption centers on 
enforcement issues—especially focused on how the United States could ever hope to 
track or punish low-level payments in diverse foreign countries by individuals who may 
be employed very indirectly by US companies.104 The answer to this is that the vast 
number of infractions probably will go unpunished.  But it is definitely possible that the 
ban on administrative payments would at least in some cases be enforceable.  The US 
government has in the past amassed information about routine administrative bribery by 
its companies and their subsidiaries,105 and numerous routes for obtaining additional 
evidence could be imagined, including disgruntled employees, tax and accounting audits 
and the like.106 
It is also important to keep in mind that the actual enforcement of a ban on 
administrative bribery is not the only standard by which the FCPA’s reform should be 
 
104 Peter Clarke, formally responsible for FCPA prosecutions at the DOJ, has rhetorically asked: ”Do you 
really believe that our limited federal criminal enforcement resources should be deployed to against his 
kind of corruption?”, Email Message from Peter Clarke to Alexandros Zervos, Re: Question, Feb. 2, 2005.  
This skepticism about the feasibility/desirability of these prosecutions is however addressed in the sections 
examining the damage caused by facilitation payments and the negative symbolic and practical impact of 
the FCPA exemption.  Clarke also questions whether any national government would accept that these 
types of small payments constitute a bribe worth punishing—and is answered by Luxembourg’s 
government, which explained that “The new articles of the Criminal Code relating to bribery do not include 
the term "undue" contained in the OECD Convention. The result, according to the Luxembourg authorities, 
is to make so-called "facilitation" payments an offence under Luxembourg law. The Luxembourg 
authorities considered that including the word "undue" in its domestic legislation would mean that 
facilitation payments or petty gifts were tolerated. Instead of fighting bribery more effectively, the law 
would in fact be looking on it more indulgently, since it would accept that certain practices, though 
harmful, would no longer fall within the scope of the law. Luxembourg considers that this would be a step 
backward in the fight against bribery and how it is perceived. In the opinion of the Conseil d’Etat, ‘it would 
be inconsistent to tolerate facilitation payments while at the same time criminalising other payments 
because they involved larger sums of money’” (citation omitted).  OECD, LUXEMBOURG: PHASE 1 REPORT 
5 (2001). 
105 See Mathews, supra note 32 at 365-66. 
106 Many of the techniques currently used to detect bribery could be extended to cover the low level 
administrative bribes covered by the FCPA exemption.  See, e.g., Mathews, supra note 32.  
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measured.  As discussed in section VI. a., one of the major benefits of the change in the 
FCPA is the symbolic power of the move, and the potential that it will spur further action 
against corruption on a global level.  The relatively sparse enforcement of this rule would 
also be in line with the rest of the FCPA’s provisions, which have not been frequently 
invoked by the US government.107 Beyond the bribery sphere, the United States has 
types of legislation dealing with other behaviors occurring abroad where evidence is 
difficult to obtain, but the general moral point is considered to be sufficiently important 
to justify the legislation.108 Given the harm caused by corruption in general and 
administrative bribery in particular, removing the FCPA exemption seems to qualify for 
this type of moral gesture. 
A third area of concern around removing the FCPA exemption focuses on the 
possibility that foreign investment will be deflected from countries with high levels of 
administrative bribery to ones with lower levels, in order to reduce both aggravation and 
bureaucratic delays for companies and their employees.  It is certainly true that countries 
with high levels of corruption see a reduction in their foreign investment.109 But the 
proposed change to the FCPA, as discussed above, is not so radical that it is likely to be a 
deciding factor in choices about where to target investment.  It is more likely that the 
high level of administrative corruption, and the extra losses in terms of time and energy 
this causes,110 will deflect companies from investing in countries with high levels of 
administrative corruption.  The practical impact of the change in the FCPA rules is 
unlikely to be a central cause of any deflection.  
 
107 See Mathews, supra not 32 at 305. 
108 Karene Jullien, The Recent International Effort to End Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, 31 
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 579, 580 (2003). 
109 See Wei supra note 1 at 9. 
110 See Hellman supra note 64 at 19. 
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A fourth set of concerns triggered by amending the FCPA focuses on the 
possibility that the change will in some sense be culturally imperialist or an imposition of 
western values/ways of doing business on other countries.  Under this scenario, the high 
level bribes banned by the FCPA could be considered to be corrupt from any perspective, 
while the low-level bribes currently exempted are much more closely related to some 
traditions of gift giving and the like.  Forcing US companies to comply with the FCPA on 
this scenario would be that their local subsidiaries and business partners in other 
countries would be forced to change their traditional business ways to suit US moral 
crusading. 
While avoiding cultural imperialism is important, the concern about the cultural 
imperialism inherent in action against bribery is misplaced, even in the case of small 
scale payments.  Numerous authors, looking at all sorts of corruption, have documented 
that perceptions of corruption are remarkably similar across cultures and regions, with the 
line between bribery and gift giving much clearer than might be supposed.111 More 
specifically, the FCPA applies specifically to payments that contravene written local laws 
in other countries.112 While it might be argued that these laws may not reflect traditional 
ways of doing business or common cultural understandings, it is both complicated and 
potentially presumptuous for US politicians or businesspeople to differentiate which local 
laws they will choose to respect.  Instead, it is appropriate to respect other countries’ 
official determinations of which types of payments constitute corruption and which do 
not. 
 
111 See, e.g.,  Wei, supra note 1 at 14-16. 
112 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-1(c)(1) (2000) (for issuers); 15 U.S.C. §  78dd-2(c)(1) (2000) (for domestic concerns); 
15 U.S.C. §  78dd-3(c)(1) (2000) (for "any person"). 
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A final area of concern involves potential unwanted side effects from amending 
the FCPA to eliminate low-level administrative bribes.  Theoretically, the elimination of 
the “grace zone” for low-level bribes might motivate those firms that choose to break the 
law to provide larger and/or more frequent bribes.  In this view, by extending 
criminalization to acts that many consider legitimate, the US government would lessen 
the inhibitions against pursuing broader ranges of criminal activity.  But while this impact 
is certainly important to consider, the FCPA’s ban on payments that are already illegal in 
the country in which they are made means that those actors affected have already chosen 
to break the law in at least one jurisdiction.  Once this decision is made, the impact of 
additional enforcement by US authorities does not seem so great as to invalidate the real 
benefits that amending the FCPA to exclude low-level administrative payments would 
bring. 
c. Broader Challenges 
Beyond the immediate challenges to eliminating the FCPA exemption, a broader 
conceptual concern involves the allocation of resources to this effort.  Many critics feel 
that the FCPA’s overall impact has been very modest at best—with few indications that 
US firms are less engaged in bribery of foreign officials than those of other developed 
countries.113 Any proposal to tighten the FCPA further must address the accusation that 
this initiative will at best be “more of the same”—and at worst divert precious resources 
from more effective anti-corruption efforts to meaningless moral posturing.  Countering 
this criticism requires consideration of the FCPA’s current impact, its potential impact 
should it be amended, and the resources required for the amendment proposal to succeed. 
 
113 See, e.g, Hellman, supra note 64 at 6. 
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The most fundamental criticism of attempts to eliminate the FCPA exemption for 
administrative bribery is that this effort is an ineffective use of anti-corruption resources.  
This critique does not necessarily question the negative impact of bribery in general or 
administrative payments in particular.  Instead, it focuses on the current perceived 
failures of the FCPA—both its relatively light enforcement,114 and its (potentially linked) 
alleged lack of success in making US firms less corrupt than their competitors.  This 
critique might outline other anti-corruption projects more deserving of campaigners time 
and energy—such as providing additional education and support to foreign officials 
drafting local anti bribery laws, and voluntary guidelines for multinational 
corporations.115 
Criticism of the FCPA is fair in suggesting it has not led to as much of a reduction in 
bribery of foreign officials as might have been hoped.  But the legislation has certainly 
had an impact in changing at least some behavior by US businesses—a fact slyly 
acknowledged by critics who list “increased costs to US business” as one of their main 
concerns.116 More broadly, the global adoption of the OECD convention is concrete 
proof of both the FCPA’s attractiveness as a global standard, and the US government’s 
lobbying power when it seeks to “level the playing field” for US corporations.  These 
facts suggest that both the practical and symbolic benefits of the FCPA are greater than 
the critics would suggest. 
Devoting additional energies to amending the FCPA would definitely require 
significant time and attention from the anti-corruption community.  But the benefits of 
this amendment would not be limited to changes in the law’s text alone.  A new 
 
114 See Mathews, supra note 32 at 305; Eaton supra note 32 at D2. 
115 See, e.g., Salbu, supra note 31 at 286. 
116 See Salbu, supra note 31; Hines, supra note 13 at 17. 
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campaign advocating the repeat of the FCPA’s exemption for administrative bribery 
could increase the public profile of anti-corruption efforts, putting additional pressure on 
national governments to emulate the US action or at least enforce their existing laws 
more seriously.  As discussed in section VII, a well thought out penalty scheme for low 
level administrative payments could result in increased enforcement of the FCPA—again 
increasing the public profile of anti-corruption efforts.  Most broadly, campaigns that 
highlight anti-corruption activity aren’t necessarily a zero sum game.  Instead, a 
campaign to change the FCPA could help global anti-corruption efforts by persuading 
governments and other organizations to increase anti-corruption funding and activities.  
Repealing the FCPA exemption is hardly a panacea for all the world’s corruption 
problems, but the potential practical and symbolic benefits of the repeal justify the 
resources anti-corruption campaigners would need to devote to achieve this legislative 
change. 
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VII. Creating an Effective Penalty and Enforcement Mechanism 
The conclusion that low-level administrative bribes should be criminalized in line 
with other types of bribery outside the United States does not mean that the penalty 
schemes in all cases should be identical.  In fact, given the very real problems with 
current FCPA enforcement and impact currently documented,117 a different enforcement 
approach to low level administrative bribes is appropriate.  Considering the differences 
between large and small-scale bribery, a graduated system that encourages voluntary 
compliance and higher awareness by senior company officials is most appropriate.  
Domestic US efforts to halt bribery in corrupt labor unions provides one model on which 
these awareness and voluntary compliance efforts might be based.  All these different 
penalty approaches need to be combined with a variety of enforcement means to 
overcome the difficulties of monitoring criminal behavior outside the United States. 
a.  Distinct Characteristics of Small Scale Administrative Bribery  
As the current FCPA exemption suggests, low-level administrative bribery is not 
like other types of bribes.  While their negative impact is difficult to dispute, these bribes 
have several characteristics that are different from the high level international bribery 
originally targeted by the FCPA.  By definition, low-level administrative bribery involves 
only small amounts of money per transaction—so that it is much easier (e.g. cheaper) to 
pay a large number of these bribes.  Again on its own terms, the FCPA’s exemption 
covers bribes to promote routine government action—which suggests that the actions are 
repetitive (more so, at least, than one-off events like contracts for items like purchases of 
military equipment), and thus that these bribes are as well.  In short, small-scale 
 
117 See, e.g., Salbu, supra note 31. 
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administrative bribery involves a large number of discrete “minor” acts, rather than a few 
large scale and/or one-off payments.   
The relative prevalence and relatively low importance (in monetary terms) of 
individual acts of administrative bribery have several consequences.  There is a higher 
likelihood that an act of actual bribery will be observed by parties outside the 
transaction—because of the larger number of parties involved and the large number of 
discrete acts that run the risk of being observed.  Conversely, individual low level bribes 
are much easier to hide within larger accounting items—the small size of the bribes 
makes the accounting discrepancies much more minor.  Explicit authorization for low-
level bribery is likely to come at lower levels in companies than larger bribes would—
because the individual impact of specific payments is much lower—and thus may be 
harder to monitor centrally.  Overall, it is the cumulative effects of low-level 
administrative bribery are the primary reason for banning the practice.  Individual 
payments of small amounts of grease money are less harmful than individual payments of 
large structural bribes.   
b.  Appropriate Penalties for Low Level Bribery 
Currently, potential criminal penalties for individuals convicted of bribery under 
the FCPA include the possibility of a prison sentence of up to five years and fines of up 
to $100,000.  Corporations have received fines in excess of $2,000,000. 118 The structural 
differences when compared to large-scale bribery suggest that low level administrative 
bribes should be punished by a different type of penalty scheme—focusing on the 
cumulative harm caused by repeated provision of small bribes.  Especially given that 
policies on low-level corruption would be criminalizing previously legal behavior, a 
 
118 Perkel, supra note 9, at 702. 
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penalty scheme that provides a “safe harbor” incentive for declaring and remedying past 
practices should be considered.  In addition, first offenses should be treated lightly, 
perhaps with a probation/monitoring scheme similar to that adopted for some American 
labor unions facing corruption charges.  In the long term however, repeated violations of 
the law should trigger penalties just as harsh as those punishing large individual 
payments.  Finally, lax policies/multiple convictions for low-level administrative bribery 
should be explicitly identified as an indicator of broader corporate honesty problems—
and automatically trigger additional investigations/supervision.  While this differential 
scheme runs the risk of lessening the symbolic message of making low-level 
administrative bribes illegal, the potential benefits outweigh the risks. 
A graduated penalty scheme that allows high level private sector executives to 
uncover and change low-level bribe giving practices would probably be the most 
effective means of reducing this type of corruption rapidly (at least when relying on an 
FCPA style law).  This type of incentive would ideally be conducted in two stages:  a 
voluntary pre-enforcement one, and a stricter one after a first violation is discovered.  The 
experience of US prosecutors using RICO statutes to force changes in corrupt labor 
unions, and some current efforts by US companies to investigate criminal behavior by 
their employees, are instructive with regard to the types of oversight programs that might 
be implemented. 
As discussed in sub-section VII.a., one of the characteristics of low-level 
administrative bribery is that approval for small bribes can be given at lower levels of 
authority and hidden relatively easily in accounting systems.  In some cases, top 
executives may thus be genuinely ignorant about bribery, or at minimum unclear about its 
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extent.  Any criminalization low-level administrative bribery should provide a period 
during which companies can conduct internal investigations of low-level bribery 
practices, identify where they occur, and adopt plans to combat the problem.  If these 
investigations are recorded and reported to the DOJ, a “safe harbor” provision should 
protect these companies from prosecution.  This safe harbor provision will encourage 
fuller investigation and accounting of low level bribery (saving DOJ resources); make the 
changing legislation more palatable for companies, and easier to implement (because they 
can conduct internal investigations without worrying about unpleasant findings); and 
even provide useful information about where low level bribery typically occurs (useful 
for monitoring future low-level bribery in all companies).    
Even if companies don’t take advantage of the safe harbor provision, first 
offences (or evidence of potential first offences) should be used to encourage full internal 
investigations and confessions rather than simply leading to application of full penalties.  
Internal investigations undertaken in lieu of prosecution under the FCPA would of course 
be more stringent, potentially involving FBI/outside monitor participation rather than 
relying on self-reporting.  The results could also lead to symbolic fines, depending on 
circumstances.  But again, the overall goal should be to establish strong, internal anti-
bribery systems in companies, ensuring that top executives are able to monitor and end 
the practice. 
Monitoring of corrupt labor unions provides an example of the success that these 
kinds of internal and external monitoring mechanisms can have.  Though unions are very 
different from commercial companies, they share certain characteristics which makes the 
comparison useful.  Most notably, they can be large organizations where top-level 
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executives are not always aware about wrong-doing at lower levels.  They also faced a 
new legal environment when the RICO statutes began to be applied to union corruption, 
proving additional incentives to cooperate with federal prosecutors in stamping out 
corruption. 
One good example of success in efforts to clean up corruption—which might 
parallel efforts to comply with a safe harbor provision-- is provided by the internal reform 
efforts of the Laborers Union International of North America (LIUNA).  In 1995, facing 
the possibility of a civil racketeering lawsuit accusing it of being influenced by organized 
crime, the union agreed with federal prosecutors to conduct its own cleanup effort.119 
This involved hiring a former prosecutor and former inspector general to oversee internal 
anti-corruption efforts,120 as well as the removal of hundreds of officials for corruption or 
links with organized crime.121 This type of internal effort at organizational change may 
be more effective than simply punishing the organization as a whole—it involves top 
officials (even ones with unclear ties to the corruption) making real efforts to reform an 
organization in order to avoid the costs associated with criminal prosecution.  LIUNA’s 
effort was enough to convince federal prosecutors to give up the option of taking over the 
union.122 
The Teamsters are a second good example of monitoring/oversight.  While the 
LIUNA case parallels potential efforts to meet a safe harbor requirement, the Teamsters’ 
case is a good example of efforts in lieu of conviction for an actual offense.  The 
 
119 Steven Greenhouse, Union Cleanup Praised, NY TIMES, Jan. 21, 2000 at A20 [hereinafter UNION 
CLEANUP]. 
120 Steven Greenhouse, Republicans Questioning Federal Deal with Union, NY TIMES, Jul. 14, 1996 at 
A14. 
121 See UNION CLEANUP, supra note 119 at A20. 
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Teamsters accepted external monitoring in 1989 to settle a federal racketeering lawsuit.  
This external monitoring included paying for a government investigations officer and 
dozens of investigators to go through the union and uncover instances of corruption.123 
While the extent and length of this supervision (which continues today) would not be 
applied in anti-corruption cases, the successes of this external supervision in reducing 
Teamster corruption suggests the potential for similar achievements when monitoring 
businesses subject to prosecution for a first offense.    
These types of internal and external investigations are not limited to labor unions.  
Private companies routinely use lawyers and others to investigate and report internal 
wrongdoing.  For example, UBS appointed a law firm to investigate illegal activity by 
lower level Swiss employees involving shipments of US currency to Iran and other 
countries facing sanctions.  While UBS received a hefty fine, it did not have to face 
criminal penalties because of its internal investigations, which involved tracing and 
reporting all illegal activity to federal authorities.124 In addition to outside consultants, 
companies with pre-existing structures for reporting and stopping bribery could extend 
these to low-level bribes (if they were not already covered).   
After a first offense or “safe harbor period”, penalties for repeat offenders would 
need to be just as high or higher than the current ones targeting large-scale bribery.  This 
“stick” would be essential for the success of (and participation in) self-change programs 
on the part of affected companies.  The labor union and UBS examples previously 
discussed were impelled by the fear of federal prosecution—and the high penalties that 
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would entail.  Without this fear, it is unlikely that a sense of good citizenship alone would 
impel companies to route out and report their legal infractions.   
Instituting a legally binding penalty system that encourages internal change would 
bring a number of benefits.  The “internal reform” offered in response to evidence of a 
first infraction would shield both the FCPA and lawmakers from the allegation that they 
were jailing individuals and disrupting developing country economies over a few tiny, 
one-off payments.  Repeat offenders—with a public track record of illegality—would be 
much less sympathetic defendants.  More practically, the grace period for payments 
would allow companies to transition into the new bribery framework without delaying the 
symbolic benefit of criminalizing low-level administrative bribery.  Those companies that 
found themselves discussing first infractions of the law with the DOJ would have strong 
incentives to tighten their corporate compliance systems in order to avoid the higher 
penalties levied on repeat offenders.   
On an operational level, a gradually increasing system of penalties would provide 
incentives for actors across the spectrum to cooperate in enforcing the FCPA more 
vigorously.  Though these operational reactions would be hard to legally enforce, an 
appropriate penalty system might lead to more enforcement than is currently the case.  
This is especially the case for individuals who observe low-level administrative bribery 
and those in the DOJ and SEC responsible for prosecuting under the FCPA.  As discussed 
above, low-level administrative bribes are more likely to be observed than other types of 
bribes because of their frequency.  Individuals who observe these may be reluctant to 
report them to US authorities if prison sentences or serious fines could result—not just 
out of concern for individuals paying bribes, but also because of the impact these 
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penalties would have on continued local operations of affected companies.125 If they 
were assured that first offences resulted in corporate cleanup efforts rather than fines/jail, 
they might be more willing to provide information.    
Lower penalty levels might also encourage US officials in charge of 
implementing the FCPA to be more aggressive in bringing prosecutions.  If officials were 
assured that any initial prosecutions would not have ruinous effects on those prosecuted, 
they might be less reluctant to bring additional cases—especially if provided with 
additional information from NGO workers and other sources abroad.  An increase in 
prosecutions for low-level administrative bribery might also provide the DOJ with 
additional resources for attacking other types of bribery—by allowing investigations of 
affected firms, and providing an indication of which firms might have a more general 
problem with bribery.  In this sense, low-level administrative bribery would function as a 
“canary in the coal mine”—providing first indications that there might be broader bribery 
issues to watch for in specific firms. 
The benefits of this alternative sentencing would obviously need to be weighed 
against the possibility that codifying lower penalties for some individual acts of 
administrative bribery could send the message that they are “less important” than other 
types of bribery.  While this is definitely a possibility, the fact that all types of bribery 
will be criminalized would still be the primary message of removing the FCPA 
exemption.  Any parties examining details like sentencing differentials would almost 
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certainly also understand that repeated administrative bribery was punished just as 
harshly as other types of bribes.  This overall message—that the cumulative impact of 
administrative bribery is even more significant than a sum of the individual acts of low-
level administrative bribery—very accurately reflects the corrosive effect of “grease 
money”. 
c.  Enforcement 
In addition to codifying graduated penalty systems, making an amended FCPA 
most useful will require special enforcement efforts—taking into account the difficulties 
of enforcing restrictions on behavior outside the United States and the limited nature of 
the target group.  Most basically, the DOJ would need to make greater use of tools it 
currently has for reducing corruption.  More broadly, the DOJ and FBI will need to 
consider adding work on anti-corruption to the remit of FBI agents stationed overseas.  
Finally, the DOJ should consider a more active campaign to encourage whistleblowers—
both within enterprises engaging in corruption and from NGOs, IOs and other private 
companies operating abroad.  This combination of measures might seem chaotic, but their 
overall weight could prove significantly more effective at enforcing a revised FCPA than 
current efforts have been. 
Any effort to enforce an amended (or indeed the current) FCPA must take into 
account the unique nature of the crimes being committed.  Because the FCPA 
criminalizes bribery conducted entirely outside the United States, US enforcement 
agencies have much less freedom to operate than they otherwise would.  Many actions 
easily accomplished in the United States—like wire tapping—are much more difficult to 
arrange overseas.  In addition, unlike bribery statutes within the United States, only those 
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paying the bribes—not those receiving them—are subject to penalties.  These limits on 
the scope of both the legislation and the means of enforcement inevitably reduce the 
ability of the DOJ to enforce the FCPA. 
 These difficulties may be a partial explanation for the relatively low levels of 
FCPA enforcement.  Nonetheless, good use of current FCPA enforcement tools can lead 
to prosecutions.  As discussed, the accounting violations component of the legislation 
makes it easier to identify and penalize bribery abroad.  Though it may be harder to 
pinpoint individual low-level bribes in company accounts, their repeated nature may 
make identification easier.  Additionally, the DOJ already conducts activities overseas.  It 
stations FBI agents in embassies all over the world, focusing on cooperation with local 
law enforcement and following up foreign leads in domestic cases.  While these agents 
tend to focus on high profile issues like counter-terrorism,126 their remit could certainly 
be expanded if the DOJ placed sufficient priority on anti-corruption efforts.  Using 
existing links with foreign security and police services, FBI agents stationed overseas 
could certainly gather evidence in at least some instances of low (and high level for that 
matter) bribery.   
 Beyond using existing resources and techniques,127 the DOJ would also need to 
consider broader efforts to encourage witnesses to low-level bribery to come forward.128 
The repeated nature of these actions suggests a higher probability that at least some of 
them will be observed, and these witnesses could be a key part of an anti-bribery arsenal.  
 
126 See, e.g., Eric Eckholm, US Official Praises China for its Cooperation in Rooting Out Bin Laden’s 
Terror Network, NY TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001 at B5. 
127 In its report to the OECD, the US focuses almost solely on information provided directly by other 
governments and on mutual assistance treaties.  OECD, UNITED STATES: PHASE 2 REPORT 28 (2002). 
128 This is already done to a certain extent by some countries.  See, e.g., OECD, SWITZERLAND: PHASE 2
REPORT 13-22 (2005) (including descriptions of prosecutions based on whistleblowers, media reports). 
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As discussed in subsection VII.b, the graduated penalty scheme could encourage 
additional witnesses to come forward, secure in the knowledge that they would not do 
multinationals major economic damage.  In addition, the DOJ could consider providing 
useful whistleblowers and other witnesses with reward payments similar to those given 
for suspected terrorists.  These payments have been effective in encouraging informers 
for other types of crimes and could be useful for attacking corruption as well.129 
These ideas for expanding enforcement of an amended FCPA assume real interest 
on the part of an administration in eliminating low-level bribes of foreign officials.  The 
damage that this kind of bribery causes to both developing countries and US companies 
in the long run seems to be sufficient evidence to justify this increase in enforcement 
activity.  But given the rush of other priorities (and short term opposition from 
businesses), any campaign for an amendment to the FCPA would need to include efforts 
to monitor enforcement of the amended act, to ensure that innovative penalty systems and 
additional enforcement options are actually used. 
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VIII.  Conclusion 
 As the previous sections discuss, there are strong reasons for amending the FCPA 
to eliminate the exemption for administrative payments.  This action not only addresses 
some of the concerns about the FCPA’s alleged ambiguities130 but also improves the 
strength and consistency of the United States’ global anti-corruption message.  Beyond 
the specifics of the FCPA, a number of larger questions remain about broader legislation 
along the FCPA model.  But these concerns are not sufficient to override the need to 
amend the act, at least in the current legislative context. 
When considering the strength of global rhetoric about the evils of corruption, it is 
surprising that exemptions like those found in the FCPA and OECD conventions have 
persisted as long as they have.  As discussed in Section IV, the myth that low-level grease 
payments are less significant has been put to rest by recent economic studies—as have 
the broader arguments that attacks on corruption constitute cultural imperialism.131 The 
immediate rationale for amending the FCPA to remove the exemption for low-level 
facilitation payments is strong and convincing. 
On a macro level, three major questions hang over attempts to make the FCPA 
stricter:  whether corruption is the most important focus of international resources; 
whether criminal legislation passed mostly for its symbolic value is appropriate; and 
whether the US and other developing countries should thrust “pet” initiatives like this one 
onto developing countries.  The first challenge focuses on the broad range of international 
problems, and the limited resources available to tackle them (money, time etc.).  Rules 
mostly involving the business climate don’t appear to immediately address pressing 
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issues like the AIDS crisis an the like.  But the economic costs of corruption, identified in 
numerous studies, points to the major flaw in this criticism.  Corruption’s toll on 
developing country economies and the poor who live there mean that it is a drag on 
almost any type of international humanitarian effort—and that attempts to reduce this 
corruption will positively impact all other programs.  Though the FCPA is focused on 
private businesses, the reductions in overall corruption its amendment could achieve 
justify significant a significant investment of resources. 
A second macro question is whether criminal legislation passed mostly for the 
symbolic value rather than as an effort to provide practical tools to law enforcement is the 
right way to craft a system of legal sanctions.  Passing rarely enforced laws, that are used 
for exemplary purposes, against only a few parties, carries the potential for abuse, 
illegitimate targeting of political enemies and the like.  There are two responses to this 
challenge.  Most immediately, it could be argued that the challenges of gathering 
evidence abroad means that practical, rather than political considerations result in limited 
prosecutions, reducing the scope for abuse of power.  More generally though, the 
decision to make use of symbolic laws has already been made.  From the FCPA as it 
currently stands to rules about speed limits, US society already possesses a culture where 
laws are only selectively enforced and are passed more for their symbolic purpose than 
their practical impact.  Given this context, the harm that low-level administrative 
corruption causes, and the very real possibility that amending the FCPA will help change 
global laws and attitudes towards low-level corruption, extending the scope of symbolic 
lawmaking in this way seems both legitimate and useful.    
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 A final question is whether developed countries like the United States should even 
try to pass legislation basically aimed at “supporting” pet initiatives in foreign countries 
(often developing ones).  This effort could be interpreted as patronizing, suggesting that 
other countries can’t enforce their laws and that United States companies and individuals 
are answerable only to their own government.  In the extreme, it could be taken as a 
suggestion that US companies need only follow local laws that the US government 
supports through specific legislation like the FCPA.  But though this macro level concern 
is important, the harm caused by administrative corruption, and its prevalence despite 
local laws in certain countries, provides at least partial justification for laws like the 
FCPA.  Additionally, it could be argued that the United States has a right to regulate the 
behavior of its representatives abroad, and that requiring extra respect for some types of 
local laws is a domestically focused policy rather than an imperialist effort.132 Finally, as 
is the case with the second macro level objection, the United States has already made the 
policy choice to regulate its citizens’ and firms’ activities abroad.  Given that the policy 
choice to use this tool has been made, focusing on reducing administrative corruption 
seems a particularly defensible decision given its deleterious impact on the global 
community. 
 The decision to amend the FCPA to make it fully consistent with US and 
international rhetoric and best practice involves bidding a final farewell to well-worn 
clichés about how things “get done” in developing countries.  The FCPA as it currently 
stands is an important marker of the gradual understanding that changing a culture of 
corruption involves not just reforming bureaucrats but also consumers—businesses and 
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individuals.  Through the FCPA, the United States has made active its desire that it and 
its businesses take a lead in changing cultures of corruption.  Happily for the rest of the 
world, eliminating corruption is an area where the United States’ efforts to raise others to 
its own aspired standards are beneficial.  Amending the FCPA to remove the exemption 
for “grease” money would mark the completion of the conceptual revolution that the 
FCPA’s passage began—affirming that no bribery, no matter in what amount or for what 
purpose is acceptable for US corporations.  Making current developed world rhetoric 
about corruption consistent with its laws will in no way immediately solve this problem.  
But it does have the potential to re-energize global anti-corruption efforts while making 
them broader and more effective. 
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